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Changes in Drought Policies in New Zealand
This article appeared in the June 1996 issue of Drought Network News.
Drought Characteristics
New Zealand, lying in the South Pacific Ocean approximately 1,200
miles east of Australia, is subject to recurring droughts. Its two main islands
are long and narrow, with high mountain ranges and hill country bisecting
them from north to south. The predominant westerly winds, along with the
mountain ranges and hill country, produce a marked orographic effect. Thus,
the western side of the country, in general, records significantly higher
annual average rainfall totals than does land on the eastern side.
The country has experienced a number of severe droughts throughout its
history, especially in the east, where a number of extended periods of low
rainfall have severely affected pastoral agriculture (historically New Zealand’s
major industry). Droughts that extend across autumn and/or spring are
generally the most severe in terms of their effects on grass production at
crucial stages of the growing season. Recent research on farmers’ responses
to drought suggests that many farmers tend to “farm for droughts,” by
ensuring that stock numbers are low throughout the summer months, which
are generally expected to be dry (Keen, 1995).
Central Government Policies for Drought
For many years, the New Zealand government has played a key role in
assisting farmers through adverse climatic events (including drought). The
main policy agency involved is the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
(MAF). The types of assistance offered have changed over time, as has the
philosophy behind the government’s role in adverse climatic events, consis-
tent with changes in overall national economic policy (Sandrey, 1990).
Relief measures before the mid-1980s. Before 1970, relief for drought
was ad hoc, and included loans, bank overdraft guarantees, tax relief on the
forced sale of livestock, subsidies for re-grassing, and transport subsidies for
stock and fodder (Morriss, 1992). In 1979, a discussion paper released by
MAF recommended that the balance of government assistance be shifted
away from subsidies and toward loans. This took effect in February 1980,
with post-drought subsidies being discontinued. Despite these changes,
farmers having damage from successive drought events continued to receive
greater and greater levels of central government assistance throughout the
early 1980s (Morriss, 1991).
1986 review. By 1986, government assistance measures for adverse
events were seen to be strongly built into farmers’ expectations, influencing
their perceptions of risk (Sandrey, 1990). In particular, assistance seemed to
encourage farmers to produce according to optimum (economic and environ-
mental) years, because it protected them from the costs associated with sub-
optimal years. Government assistance measures discouraged farmers from
carrying out practices that would reduce their vulnerability to extreme
climatic events, because the government was there to “bail” farmers out
(Dickinson and Sandrey, 1986).
In October 1986, changes were announced that tightened the eligibility
criteria for adverse events assistance and altered the forms of assistance that
were available. The changes reflected the overall movement of central
government economic policy toward a more market-led economic environ-
ment.
Meteorological criteria were developed to determine when adverse
events occurred. For drought, an event had to be of such severity that it had
a 1-in-20-year recurrence interval before assistance measures would be
considered. Drought was measured by the number of soil moisture deficit
days occurring in the summer, or a lack of rainfall in the winter, compared
with the average situation over a 3-month period (Rural Policy Unit, 1990).
Less severe events, with higher probabilities of occurrence, were regarded as
the risk management responsibility of individual farmers.
Before farmers could be eligible for climatic relief loans, the areas in
which their farms were situated had to be declared as “adverse events relief
areas” using the meteorological criteria outlined above. Second, to be
eligible for a loan, the farms in question had to have been viable and meet
certain lending criteria before the drought occurred, the event had to have
rendered the farms nonviable, and the advancement of the loan had to result
in the farm’s return to a viable state.
1988–89 east coast droughts. In the summer of 1988–89, severe
droughts developed on the east coasts of both the North Island and the South
Island. At that time, the financial position of farmers in the affected areas was
extremely poor, with rising costs, particularly interest rates, and low product
prices. Farmers were in the midst of adjusting to significant changes in the
economic environment, and poor profits and falling land prices had reduced
many farmers’ equity to a very low level. Confidence levels among the
farming community were very low, and stress suffered within farming
families was high (Morriss, 1992).
In response to such factors, many farmers tried to maximize their short-
term profits by increasing stock numbers to levels that were only sustainable
in ideal climatic conditions. As a result, feed reserves were minimal and
stock condition was poor going into the drought (Brown Copeland and
Company Ltd, 1991). Thus, farmers were vulnerable to the effects of the
drought in part because their capacity to absorb and recover from the effects
of the extreme event was diminished.
As the regional economies of affected areas were seen to be at risk, a
drought assistance package was introduced by central government (Morriss,
1991). The package included five main components. Adverse Events
Family Income Support was available so that farm income was not run
down by family living expenses (such as feeding and clothing family
members). Farm Appraisals were offered to assist farmers in making
decisions about the future viability of their farm businesses, assess their
rehabilitation needs, and plan sustainable rehabilitation and ongoing farming
programs. New Start Grants were available (up to a maximum of
NZ$45,000), enabling farmers who were in an untenable financial position
to vacate their property and make a new start in another industry. Drought
Rehabilitation Loans were obtainable, dependent on the future viability of
the farms in question. The loans were interest-free for the first two years,
with the government providing a guarantee of 80% of their value for four
years. The expenditure of loans was tied to certain activities, including
capital stock replacement, pasture renewal, and fertilizer application. The
Technology Transfer Programme was designed to develop and encourage
the implementation of improved dryland farming techniques, through re-
search, educational on-farm field days, and the production of information
booklets.
1989 review. Government expenditure on adverse climatic events assis-
tance increased significantly throughout the late 1980s and led, in December
1989, to a further review of policy. The review aimed to develop a system
that was equitable and consistent between events, reflecting both the scale
and impact of those events (Morriss, 1991). Risk management was to be
encouraged, rather than emergency response. The responsibility for manag-
ing “inherent but predictable risks” was shifted to individuals, industry
organizations, and local government agencies, with central government
involvement only as a last resort (Rural Policy Unit, 1990). The reviewed
policies came into force from 1 July 1990.
1991—Resource Management Act. In 1988–89, a major review of the
legislation relating to the management of New Zealand’s natural environ-
ment occurred, resulting in the Resource Management Act 1991. This Act
gave local government agencies (regional and district councils) responsibil-
ity for the management of natural hazards, including drought. The legislation
was drafted in a somewhat flexible manner, allowing each local government
agency to decide which natural hazards are significant enough to be managed
in each local area.
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Issues Yet to Be Resolved
A number of issues from the 1989 review and the introduction of the
Resource Management Act 1991 have yet to be fully resolved.
Determining the occurrence of severe droughts. It is still unclear what
the “trigger points” should be that would indicate a need for government
assistance (Morriss, 1991). Current central government policies for drought
limit assistance to cases of extremely severe events that are beyond the
coping capacity of local communities. Certain meteorological criteria must
be met, and a region’s economy must be seen to be at risk. However, in
practice, recent extreme events have shown that it is difficult to determine the
degree and type of regional economic impacts that should be used as a
threshold (Morriss, 1991). The degree to which central government assis-
tance is provided tends to depend, to an extent, on the effectiveness of local
farming lobby groups in persuading central government of the need for
assistance.
Long-term adjustment programs. Consideration of New Zealand
drought policies suggests that government assistance has tended to promote
short-term recovery rather than long-term adjustment to drought. Although
successive governments have stated the intention to make individuals re-
sponsible for the management of risk associated with drought, insufficient
effort has gone into the encouragement of prudent risk management prac-
tices. Morriss (1991) suggests that there has actually been no reduction in
government’s exposure to future claims for relief.
Central government does not currently have an ongoing role in the
facilitation of practices that are likely to make farms less susceptible to the
effects of droughts in the future. Although the Technology Transfer
Programme (part of the 1988–89 drought package) did provide farmers with
information on risk management techniques, programmed government fund-
ing into such programs has now ceased. Researchers must now bid competi-
tively for funding, and there are no programs to ensure that the results of
research are effectively disseminated to farmers.
Severe drought events. Even if a program encouraging long-term
drought adjustment in the future were developed, it should still be recognized
that, occasionally, extremely severe drought events will occur. Sometimes
the effects of drought events will be compounded by antecedent environmen-
tal and economic conditions, the impacts of which will be affected only to a
limited degree by wise drought management practices.
No severe droughts have occurred in New Zealand since the most recent
review (1989) of central government policies for adverse climatic events
assistance. It is difficult to determine whether the central government’s
resolve to restrict drought relief to extremely severe events will hold in the
future. In the past, in New Zealand and overseas, central government policy
goals for drought have sometimes been undermined as a result of various
contextual factors and political processes.
Implementation of policies at the local level. Successive reviews of
policies for adverse climatic event assistance have devolved responsibility
for the management of drought to local government, communities, and
individuals. Limited research has been carried out to determine how effec-
tively these policies are implemented by agencies at the local level. Research
to date suggests that the implementation is variable (Keen, 1995).
Drought has not been included in the local government plans required by
the Resource Management Act 1991 to any significant degree, even in areas
where recurring droughts have been experienced (Keen, 1995). This may
relate to the fact that before the reform of environmental legislation, local
government agencies had only been charged with managing the hazards
associated with flooding, erosion, and land instability. Staff and politicians
in local government agencies are not accustomed to managing drought.
No severe droughts have occurred since the introduction of the  Resource
Management Act 1991. Many local government agency staff interviewed in
Hawke’s Bay, a drought-prone area of the North Island east coast, in 1994
were unaware that central government had withdrawn its provisions for
assistance except in the most severe cases (Keen, 1995). The importance of
local planning for drought may not be recognized until a major drought
occurs, where central government does not respond with financial assistance.
Central government may need to direct resources toward educating people in
such agencies about their responsibilities according to current policies. It
seems that it is not enough merely for policies to exist—they must be actively
enforced and their implementation must be monitored (Burby and Dalton,
1994).
Where Do We Go from Here?
Although successive policy reviews have devolved the first line of
responsibility for drought response away from central government and to
individuals and local agencies, it is by no means clear that this will result in
satisfactory long-term adjustment to drought. Until another major drought
occurs, the ability of individuals and local agencies to cope will not be tested.
And until such a drought occurs, the strength of central government’s resolve
not to provide assistance except in the most extreme circumstances will not
be tested either.
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